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ABSTRACT
The big data industry is facing new challenges as concerns about
privacy leakage soar. One of the remedies to privacy breach inci-
dents is to encapsulate computations over sensitive data within
hardware-assisted Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). Such
TEE-powered software is called secure enclaves. Secure enclaves
hold various advantages against competing for privacy-preserving
computation solutions. However, enclaves are much more chal-
lenging to build compared with ordinary software. The reason is
that the development of TEE software must follow a restrictive
programming model to make effective use of strong memory en-
cryption and segregation enforced by hardware. These constraints
transitively apply to all third-party dependencies of the software.
If these dependencies do not officially support TEE hardware, TEE
developers have to spend additional engineering effort in porting
them. High development and maintenance cost is one of the major
obstacles against adopting TEE-based privacy protection solutions
in production.
In this paper, we present our experience and achievements with
regard to constructing and continuously maintaining a third-party
library supply chain for TEE developers. In particular, we port a
large collection of Rust third-party libraries into Intel SGX, one of
the most mature trusted computing platforms. Our supply chain
accepts upstream patches in a timely manner with SGX-specific
security auditing. We have been able to maintain the SGX ports of
159 open-source Rust libraries with reasonable operational costs.
Our work can effectively reduce the engineering cost of developing
SGX enclaves for privacy-preserving data processing and exchange.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Big-data technologies have enabled application vendors to rapidly
push out innovative features and significantly improve service
quality. The societal and economical benefits of analyzing large
volumes of real-world data have led to personal data being collected
and transferred at an unprecedented scale. Unfortunately, recently
reported incidents show that the current practices of storing and
managing personal data can be exceedingly insecure. With the
introduction of new legislation like the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), user privacy is not only a moral responsibility
but legal liability.
One of the effective ways to prevent privacy leakage without
hurting data availability is to encapsulate computation over sen-
sitive data within Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) where
memory confidentiality is securely enforced by hardware. The en-
forcement does not rely on the cooperation of privileged software
like operating systems and virtual machine managers, since they
cannot be trusted due to conflicts of interest between users, service
providers, and hardware platform owners.
To date, many chip makers have augmented their products with
advanced TEE extensions. The Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) is one of themostmature TEE implementations on themarket.
An application running in the SGX mode on an SGX-enabled CPU
is called a secure enclave. An enclave is able to remotely prove
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its identity to clients, who will send their data to the application
only if they are assured that the data will be well protected by
the enclave. Compared with other privacy-preserving solutions
such as homomorphic encryption and federated learning, TEE is
supported by specialized hardware, therefore much more efficient.
At this point, it is generally much easier to support realistic data
processing workload with TEE-based software systems.
Unfortunately, developing SGX software turns out to be quite
difficult due to various architectural constraints. For example, SGX
enclaves cannot directly perform I/O operations since the integrity
and confidentiality of any resources outside the SGX-encrypted
memory are not guaranteed. In general, to enjoy the security and
performance benefits of Intel SGX, software developers have to
adapt themselves to a much more restrictive programming model.
From the security point of view, it is imperative for software ven-
dors to transit to a more careful development paradigm if they aim
to better protect data privacy. However, the SGX programming re-
strictions transitively apply to all dependencies of an SGX program,
meaning SGX developers cannot easily offload the development of
commonly used functionalities by using third-party libraries. This
drastically drives up the cost of developing complex SGX software,
making software vendors reluctant to adopt the SGX technology.
In this paper, we share our experience with constructing and
maintaining a supply chain of SGX-compatible third-party libraries
and making them readily accessible by SGX programmers, which
helps alleviate the burden of developing SGX enclaves with com-
plicated features. Our supply chain offers open-source libraries
written in Rust, an inherently memory-safe programming language
with its performance comparable to traditional system languages
like C and C++. It has been widely acknowledged that Rust is one
of the most suitable languages for SGX enclave development.
Starting from April 2018, we have been actively porting high-
quality Rust libraries into SGX and consecutively synchronize
them with their upstream versions. We developed a comprehensive
methodology to make sure that our ported libraries comply with the
SGX threat model. For libraries that are hard to meet this criterion,
we inject API-breaking changes to force enclave developers to be
well aware of the potential risks of relying on these libraries inside
SGX. To keep the maintenance cost at a manageable level, we built
a pipeline to automate a large amount of the work needed to up-
date the forked libraries with upstream patches. Our investigation
shows that the third-party library supply chain has supported the
development of numerous high-quality open-source SGX projects.
In summary, we make the following major contributions in this
paper,
• We identify the lack of third-party library support as a key
software engineering challenge in building privacy-preserving
big data applications with Intel SGX and provides a realistic
solution to the problem.
• We propose a methodology to port third-party Rust libraries
into SGX, making them comply with the secure computation
thread model, setting up an accessible software supply chain
to accelerate SGX enclave software development.
• We implement a highly automated pipeline to keep the cost
of maintaining the SGX ports of 159 third-party Rust libraries
at a modest level.
• We demonstrate that our supply chain is already supporting
real-world SGX enclave development.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the background knowledge about Intel SGX and Rust.
Section 3 enumerates the objectives we would like to achieve in
this work and the corresponding challenges. Section 4 describes
the overall structure of our library supply chain. We explain our
methodology of building and maintaining the supply chain in Sec-
tion 5. Section 6 introduces our effort in providing additional tooling
support for SGX enclave development in Rust. We present empirical
results in Section 7 to demonstrate the practicality of our methodol-
ogy and the real-world impact of our work. Issues and related work
are discussed in Section 8 and Section 9, respectively. We conclude
the paper in Section 10.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel SGX
SGX is Intel’s latest major effort to enable trusted computing at
scale. For each SGX-capable Intel CPU, a unique secret is physi-
cally planted inside the chip during manufacture. Meanwhile, an
asymmetrically paired secrete is retained by Intel to verify the au-
thenticity of the SGX CPU. At run time, the CPU reserves a special
region of memory whose content is constantly encrypted with keys
derived from the planted secret. Furthermore, based on this secret,
the chip can prove to clients through remote attestation that it is
running a program whose identity is known by the clients, after
which the clients are assured that their data will be well protected
before uploading them to the program hosted by the SGX CPU.
The trust between the chip and clients is not dependent on any
intermediate software stack; instead, users only need to trust Intel’s
ability to verify the authenticity of the SGX-capable CPU and the
application software running in SGX mode.
From the perspective of SGX enclaves, system software is not
trusted. This significantly reduces the size of required Trusted Com-
puting Base (TCB) [22]; however, the resulting unprecedentedly
restrictive thread model also limits SGX programs’ capability of
acquiring computation resources from the outside untrusted envi-
ronment. In general, constraints faced by SGX developers include
but not limited to the following,
• Services provided by SGX enclaves can only be invoked
through limited call gates pre-defined by enclave writers.
These call gates are named ECALLs.
• Most hardware and software interrupts are not visible or
available to SGX enclaves. That means SGX enclaves cannot
directly request services from the OS, e.g., I/O and memory
mapping. If OS-dependent resources are indispensable, the
enclaves have to temporarily exit the SGX state through
another set of pre-defined interfaces called OCALLs.
• The RDTSC instruction is not supported in SGX. Trusted
timestamp information can only be acquired by communi-
cating with the Converged Security Engine which is part of
the Intel Management Engine. This is several orders of mag-
nitude slower than RDTSC, making it prohibitively expensive
for certain applications.
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Due to the constraints listed above, most existing software code
is incompatible with SGX. To port legacy software into SGX, de-
velopers have to re-design the trust boundary in their code, make
sure the security sensitive part is adequately isolated, and define
the ECALL and OCALL interfaces to bridge the trusted and untrusted
parts of the software. If the partition is carelessly decided, the en-
claves can still be breached by the outsidemalicious entities through
Iago attacks [8]. This makes developing and porting SGX programs
a non-trivial software engineering challenge.
2.2 The Rust Programming Language
Since the SGX hardware protects enclaves from direct interference
of system software and other applications, the actual security of
an SGX enclave is mostly decided by the enclave’s robustness of
handling potentially malicious inputs. According to a recent report,
about 70% of the vulnerabilities discovered in Microsoft products
are due to memory safety issues [19]. It is known that languages
like C and C++, although widely used in system programming, can
easily introduce memory corruptions into the software even by
experienced developers.
Rust is considered to be a promising successor of C/C++ for
developing security-sensitive software. Like C and C++, Rust is
statically typed and allows programmers to manipulate memory
layout at a fine granularity with predictable performance. More
importantly, Rust by default is memory safe. Programming in Rust
prevents most of the memory errors, including buffer overflow,
dangling pointers, data races, and use of uninitialized memory,
etc. It can also detect some other programming errors like integer
overflow, if specially configured. Beyond memory safety and per-
formance, Rust supports most expressive features found in other
modern programming languages, such as closures, generics, and
pattern matching. Programming in Rust has been shown to be very
productive [3].
The implementation of Rust is open-source, with its compilers
and other development tools actively maintained on GitHub. Rust
developers have formed a vibrant open-source community, provid-
ing a rich collection of third-party libraries of high engineering
quality. An open-source ecosystem is crucial to SGX software devel-
opment, since SGX enclaves are usually required to be audited by
its users to establish trust. Due to the aforementioned benefits, Rust
is recognized as one of the most suitable programming languages
for SGX software development.
Rust uses its own terms to express some of the common soft-
ware engineering concepts. A Rust library is called a crate. A tool
called Cargo is used to manage crate dependencies for Rust projects.
Rust also has a community registry for third-party crates called
crates.io, with which crate writers can publish their work for
other developers to use.
3 OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES
3.1 Enabling Rust Programming for SGX
Due to the unique hardware features, SGX enclaves have an entirely
different software dependency stack from that of the ordinary non-
SGX programs. Intel provides SGX-compatible standard libraries
for C and C++, plus an SDK that allows programmers to utilize
SGX functionalities through C interfaces. However, there is no
similar support for Rust. Hence, the first library we need to port
and maintain is the Rust standard library. There are some other Rust
programming primitives not available in SGX, e.g., static variables,
threading, and mutex. We will also need to enable them.
3.2 Porting Third-Party Libraries
Porting a library into SGX can require extensive manual work,
depending on its scale and complexity. Most third-party libraries
have other third-party dependencies. Therefore, the amount of
work needed to port a single library can rack up to an unexpected
level. Some libraries contain functionalities that are inherently
incompatible with SGX. In those cases, we have to slice the libraries
and keep only the SGX-compatible parts. Human labor is usually
mandatory in this process. Although there has been researched
proposing methods to automatically partition a software project to
partially fit it into SGX [17, 26], none of them are mature enough
for constructing and maintaining a high-quality software supply
chain.
3.3 Timely Updates
Many libraries we ported are being actively developed. We aim to
minimize the differences between their original versions and the
SGX versions, especially regarding major functionality and security
updates. This is a non-trivial task since the two versions of the
same library have forked. Even if the patches have been well tested
for the original library, they may break in SGX. Also, some newly
added functionalities may not fully comply with the SGX threat
model.
When the number of libraries included by our supply chain was
small, we manually track updates from the upstream and manually
merge them into the SGX versions. This workflow quickly became
impractical as the supply chain grows. Limiting the cost of manual
inspection has always been a challenge.
3.4 Compatibility with Existing Development
Practice
The Rust community has its own tooling and automation settings
for software development. On the SGX platform, we want to pro-
vide Rust programmers with a development environment they are
already familiar with. The majority of Rust developers heavily re-
lies on the library manager Cargo (and its extension Xargo) and
the community-run library registry crates.io. Our supply chain
is committed to be compatible with these tools and facilities. For
dual-purpose libraries, i.e., libraries that can be used either inside
or outside SGX, we try to minimize the configuration effort needed
for compiling them in different environments.
3.5 Supply Chain Security
The Heartbleed bug in OpenSSL is one of the most infamous ex-
amples of open-source community failure, showing how vulner-
abilities in a widely subscribed software supply chain can be a
major security threat to the entire software industry [25]. Recent
analysis about several attacks on the JavaScript library manager
npm has shown that malicious organizations and individuals can be
actively undermining the security of open-source software supply
chains [13, 16, 20]. For SGX, and privacy-preserving computation
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Figure 1: Structure of Third-Party Rust Library Supply
Chain for SGX
in general, the consequences of successful supply chain attacks may
be even more disastrous. Preventing supply chain attacks is one of
the decisive factors that drive us to maintain our own Rust library
supply chain for SGX, partially isolated from crates.io.
4 STRUCTURE
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there is no official support for devel-
oping SGX software in Rust, even without considering the lack of
third-party libraries. Therefore, as the first step towards productive
SGX enclave development in Rust, we built a modified version of
Rust standard library with SGX-specific functionalities like remote
attestation integrated. This project, called Rust SGX SDK1, serves as
the foundation of all third-party libraries we port and maintain in
the supply chain. Rust SGX SDK is based on Intel’s C/C++ SGX SDK.
We have spent considerable efforts on the security, performance,
and usability of Rust SGX SDK. In particular, we implemented a
secure foreign function interface between Rust and C/C++. The
design of the foreign function interface is formalized and proved to
be memory safe. Details about this part of the work are discussed
in a previous paper [24].
Figure 1 shows the structure of our supply chain. All third-party
Rust libraries offered by the supply chain are dependent on the Rust
standard library provided by Rust SGX SDK, while Rust SGX SDK
depends on Intel SGX SDK. Enclave developers cannot access raw
C/C++ APIs provided by Intel. All enclave applications should be
written in pure Rust to minimize the chance of creating memory-
based security vulnerabilities.
Some may view our dependency on Intel SGX SDK, which is
written in C and C++, as a frailty that weakens our memory safety
promise. Indeed, it is possible that Intel’s implementation becomes
buggy and introduces vulnerabilities into the software stack, neu-
tralizing the benefits of using Rust for enclave development. How-
ever, implementing the functionalities provided by Intel SGX SDK
in Rust leads to unreasonable engineering costs.
5 METHODOLOGY
This section describes our methodology of constructing the Rust
library supply chain for SGX. We report in detail how we decide
1https://github.com/baidu/rust-sgx-sdk
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Each Month (Months in 2018 are consolidated)
which libraries to maintain, how we port them into SGX, and how
we keep the libraries synchronized with their upstream versions.
5.1 Library Selection
The first step towards building a software supply chain for SGX is
to decide the roster of libraries to offer. This is a critical decision
because we are committed to providing long-term support for every
library covered by our supply chain. We consider the following
criteria when making a decision,
• The library provides a functionality that is widely demanded
in SGX enclave development, such as secure network proto-
cols, cryptography, and data serialization.
• The library is of high code quality.
• The library promises or empirically keeps API stability.
• The library is a dependency of other admitted libraries and
cannot be substituted by alternatives.
In general, a library has to meet several of the listed criteria to be
included by our supply chain. That being said, we do not set up strict
rules to regulate the admission but rather perform the selection
on a case-by-case basis. We constantly expand the supply chain by
gradually portingmore libraries to SGX.We identify new candidates
based on our own development requirements and requests from
the developer community.
We started constructing the supply chain in April 2018. By Sep-
tember 2019, the supply chain consists of 159 libraries. The supply
chain has been expanding at a healthy pace. Figure 2 shows the
timeline of its growth. We spent a considerable amount of time in
porting the Rust standard library in 2018. Starting from February
2019 when we finished migrating the standard library, our supply
chain began to grow in a rapid speed.
5.2 Porting Libraries into SGX
The whole workflow of porting Rust libraries into SGX takes five
major steps. The first step is to inspect the dependencies of the
to-be-ported library. The library manager of Rust can list the com-
plete dependency graph for a library. Since Rust does not allow
cyclic dependencies, we can always inspect one depended library
at a time. We first analyze which of these dependencies should be
stripped, e.g., dependencies used to support hardware or systems
on which SGX is not available. For the remaining dependencies, if
we can recursively port all of them into SGX, we can start porting
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Table 1: Ported Libraries Grouped by Size of Dependency
Closure
Dependency Closure Size # of Libraries
0 45
1 16
2 19
3 19
4 13
5 21
6–10 12
11–20 12
≥ 20 2
the library itself. Otherwise, we have to abort the porting process.
For the 159 libraries currently included by our supply chain, 45 of
them do not have extra dependencies that need to be ported and
132 of them have fewer than five such dependencies. The detailed
breakdown is in Table 1. The statistics include transitive dependen-
cies, but does not count dependencies that can be used for SGX
enclaves without modification. Many of those dependencies are
“meta” libraries that provide Rust syntax sugars, which only take ef-
fects at the preprocessing stage of the compilation. They are mostly
target independent and therefore do not need to be forked by our
library supply chain.
The second step is to pinpoint, in the library code, the usage
of resources that have to be fetched from outside the SGX trust
boundary, e.g., files, dates, and timezone information. We perform
a thorough on the security implications of the usage of these re-
sources. If using potentially untrusted resources does not lead to
a security vulnerability, we implement a corresponding OCall to
acquire the resources from outside the SGX. Otherwise, we replace
the untrusted resource with its trusted counterpart. For example,
Intel provides a trusted file system for SGX enclaves. The security
of this file system does not rely on the OS but rather enforced by
cryptographic algorithms with the keys securely contained in SGX
memory. Another example is that we can use the RDRAND instruction
as the source of random numbers instead of OS-provided random
number pools like /dev/random2. Using this kind of trusted re-
sources usually leads to un-neglectable performance cost, so we
only make this substitution unless absolutely necessary.
The third step is to disable multi-threading for the library. Since
SGX inherently distrusts the operating system, spawning new
threads inside SGX enclaves is extremely challenging3. There have
been multiple solutions to this problem proposed by the indus-
try [1, 2] and academia [12], but the general ideas are similar. When
an SGX thread wants to spawn another, it first saves its context
with an additional copy and exits the SGX state through a specially
configured OCall; then the thread spawns a new thread outside
SGX; after that, both threads enter SGX with a specially configured
ECall and restore the previously saved context. Due to multiple
2There are security concerns about backdoors in hardware-provided random numbers.
However, in the security model of SGX, Intel as the chip maker has to be trusted.
Therefore, using RDRAND does not degrade the overall security guarantees of SGX
enclaves.
3In a sense, threads are special OS-dependent resources.
CPU state switches in the process, the benefit of multi-threading
is oftentimes overwhelmed by the cost. Therefore, we decide to
completely disable multi-threading for libraries we maintain4.
The fourth step is to port the test cases of the library. Unlike
some other languages, Rust has a test framework bundled into the
language. This makes porting tests much less laborious since we
only need to support one unit test driver for SGX. We first remove
tests corresponding to functionalities that have been pruned from
the library. We then collect all tests into one enclave with a single
ECall to speed up the testing process. Note that multi-threading
inside tests are also disabled.
The last step is feature simplification. Like C and C++, Rust
supports conditional compilation. Flags controlling the compilation
conditions are called features. Library users can get slightly different
variants of the same library by indicating what features are desired
when compiling the library. One of the common scenarios where
feature customization is used is that the library writer intends to
explicitly optimize the code for different hardware architectures.
This kind of customization usually does not apply to users of our
supply chain, since all users are using very specific hardware, i.e.,
Intel CPUs supporting SGX. Therefore, we “optimize out” feature
options not needed for SGX to make the usage and maintenance of
the library less laborious.
5.3 Patches and Updates
We have built our own infrastructure to automate a large proportion
of the work needed to keep our supply chain synchronized with
upstream patches. The infrastructure can be divided into three
major components: the mega repository of all SGX-ported libraries,
the pull request cache with a merge scheduler, and the continuous
integration pipeline.
Figure 3 illustrates the workflow of our automation infrastruc-
ture. Currently, all of the libraries we ported are open-source and
managed by Git. Our library supply chain takes the form of a mega
Git repository in which each SGX-ported library is a Git submodule,
forked from its original repository. We devise a bot to monitor and
collect patches submitted to the upstream repository. The collected
patches will be sent to a pull request cache. The cache initiates
automatic merge attempts based on decisions made by a merge
scheduler. For each library, the scheduler decides to start merging
upstream patches with our SGX port when any one of the following
conditions is met:
• The commit message of a patch contains keywords like “fix”,
“bug”, “issue”, and “release”, etc.
• If the time elapsed since the last successful merge is over a
threshold. Our current configuration for this duration is one
month.
• If the number of patches accumulated in the cache has sur-
passed its capacity. By default, the cache capacity for a library
is 10.
4It should be noted that our libraries are still reentrant. In other words, there can be
multiple threads calling the same ECall interfaces to enter the SGX state simulta-
neously. We achieve this by supporting Rust thread-local storage inside SGX. Rust
itself does not yet support sub-function workload parallelism (e.g., splitting a loop to
multiple threads), which is usually realized with the help of systems like OpenMP and
Intel TBB.
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Table 2: Libraries Requiring Mandatory Manual Review
Library Functionality
rustls Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
webpki X.509 certificate validation
ring Cryptographic algorithms
cryptocorrosion Cryptographic algorithms
wasmi WebAssembly interpreter
The automatic merge fails when upstream patches conflict with
the code maintained by us. In this case, the failure is escalated to
an expert in our team who will manually review and resolve the
conflicts, until the patches can be successfully merged. After that,
our continuous integration pipelines will run the test suite shipped
with the updated library. If the CI test fails, a human expert will be
notified to review the failure and perform necessary revisions to
make sure the revised code passes the tests. The new versions are
published once they go through all CI pipelines.
Note that for libraries we consider to be of extreme security
significance, automatic merging is disabled. Every patch has to be
explicitly reviewed by an assigned library maintainer. Table 2 lists
and describes the functionality of those libraries. Indeed, the special
treatment regarding those libraries imposes a considerable amount
of human labor costs; however, we deem the cost as necessary since
software security is exceedingly critical for the SGX ecosystem.
On the other hand, Rust is memory safe. From Our experience,
manually auditing upstream updates for libraries listed in Table 2
is completely manageable.
As previously mentioned, some of our libraries have external
dependencies not included by our supply chain, since they can be
directly used by SGX enclave code without modification. However,
there is no guarantee that the future versions of those libraries will
remain compatible with the ported libraries. Therefore, in addition
to the merge-driven CI tests, we routinely run CI tests every day.
The daily CI tests aim to capture those incompatibilities. When such
an external library introduces breaking changes, we either fork the
library and include it into our supply chain or find a substitution
for it.
The automation infrastructure significantly reduces the amount
of manual work needed to maintain the supply chain. After this
infrastructure is online, a single maintainer with SGX expertise
is able to manage all 159 libraries we have ported. Indeed, the
automation framework still leaves a portion of the work for human
experts. However, we believe that part of the work should not be
spared if we want to effectively eliminate the risks of getting the
supply chain compromised.
5.4 Versioning
Most library repositories offer different versions of the same library.
Our SGX library supply chain does not follow this common practice.
For most libraries, we only offer the latest version.
The major reason behind this decision is that maintaining multi-
ple versions of the same library is not compatible with the Security
Version Number (SVN) system of SGX. This special version number
is used to control SGX-specific data backward compatibility. The
SGX hardware ensures that data produced and sealed by enclaves
with a newer SVN cannot be read by enclaves with an older SVN,
even if they are signed by the same developer.
As displayed in Figure 1, the entire supply chain is based on
Intel SGX SDK. When the SDK is updated to a new SVN, all SVNs
of the libraries in the supply chain should be updated accordingly.
This could introduce non-linear expanding of SVN if we maintain
different versions of the same library. For example, suppose we
have a library Lib with an initial version v1 and SVN k , built upon
Intel SGX SDK with SVN s . At some point, Lib itself is updated to
a new version v2 and SVN k + 1, while the SVN of Intel SGX SDK
remains s . Then at a later point, Intel SGX SDK is updated to a new
SVN s + 1. Since Intel SGX SDK is the fundamental dependency, its
security properties propagate to all libraries in the supply chain
and their SVNs should be updated accordingly. However, we cannot
handle this branching with a linear SVN. Suppose we update the
SVN of Lib-v1 from k to k + 1 and update the SVN of Lib-v2 from
k + 1 to k + 2, that would indicate Lib-v1 based on Intel SGX SDK
of SVN s + 1 is compatible with Lib-v2 based on Intel SGX SDK of
SVN s in terms of security. But that is a false implication.
We have not developed a practical solution to this problem. Po-
tentially, we can maintain different copies of the supply chain, each
based on a different version of Intel SGX SDK. But that would
bloat the maintenance cost and lead to community fragmentation,
making it much more difficult to assess and manage security risks.
Therefore, for now, we only keep the latest version of the same
library in the supply chain.
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6 TOOLING SUPPORT
Many Rust developers have their idiomatic tooling for writing and
building the code. We found that some of the commonly used tool-
ing is not available for SGX enclave developement, and the lack of
them can notably affect engineering efficiency. Therefore, in addi-
tion to third-party libraries, our supply chain provides customized
versions of development tools that can be used for building SGX
enclaves. This section enumerates our efforts in this aspect.
Protobuf. Protocol buffers (a.k.a. protobuf) is a data exchange
format developed by Google. It has become one of the most popular
data serialization solutions for open-source projects. To use proto-
buf, developers define the format of theirmessages using a language-
and platform-independent domain-specific language. A protobuf
compiler is then invoked to generate the code stubs that can repre-
sent, parse, and dump protobuf messages in the programming lan-
guages favored by the developers. The Rust community has its own
protobuf compiler implementation called rust-protobuf. Many
libraries in our supply chain employ protobuf, but the code pro-
duced by rust-protobuf is not compatible with SGX. Therefore,
we forked rust-protobuf and augmented it with the capability of
generating Rust code stubs that can be linked to SGX enclaves.
Code coverage. Code coverage analysis is a widely needed soft-
ware engineering capability for assessing the quality of test cases.
Rust currently supports the LLVM code coverage analysis, and
we spent effort to make it available for SGX enclaves as well. Our
coverage analysis can merge results from multiple threads and pro-
cesses. By using our supply chain, enclave developers can profile
the code coverage of their integration tests for both the SGX part
and non-SGX part.
Cross-Platform Optimization. Since SGX is not available on all
Intel CPUs, enclave developers often need to perform cross compi-
lation. Some SGX enclaves are very CPU intensive and developers
want to utilize all possible optimization opportunities offered by
the compiler. This is hard to achieve using Cargo, the official library
manager and compilation driver of Rust, since it offers very limited
customization options for the target CPU, and the standard library
is offered as pre-compiled binaries targeting the host CPU. To cir-
cumvent the constraints, some Rust developers use Xargo, a Cargo
alternative that supports easy configuration of cross-compilation
and allows them to rebuild the entire standard library. For example,
the open-source deep learning compiler stack TVM [9] relies on
Xargo to build SGX enclaves. Our supply chain has special support
for Xargo cross-compilation targeting SGX-enabled CPUs.
7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Wehave gathered rich empirical data to demonstrate the practicality
of our methodology and the value of our work. With these results,
we aim to answer the following research questions,
RQ1 Does our library supply chain fulfill the need of SGX enclave
developers?
RQ2 What is the operational cost of building and maintaining
such a supply chain?
RQ3 Can our supply chain support real-world SGX enclave devel-
opment?
Table 3: Supplied Libraries by Functionality
Functionality Category # of Libraries
String Manipulation 7
Data Structure and Algorithm 6
Parsing 3
Binary Data Processing 10
Time and Date 2
Compression 5
Logging 2
Serialization 11
Randomness 3
Non-Cryptographic Hash 20
Image Processing 5
Crypto 42
Network 7
Safe Integer Processing 8
I/O 2
Scientific Computation 2
WebAssembly 3
Machine Learning 1
Blockchain Utils 8
Threading 2
Database 2
Miscellaneous 8
RQ1: Does our library supply chain fulfill the need of devel-
opers?
To attract a meaningful number of developers to subscribe to our
library supply chain, we need to offer a wide range of selections to
meet various kinds of development demands.
We measure the diversity of the libraries by assigning each of
them a functionality category. Table 3 lists the number of libraries
in each category. It can be seen that our supply chain covers a
wide range of commonly needed functionalities in software devel-
opment. In particular, we provide a rich collection of cryptographic
libraries, which are exceedingly important in privacy-preserving
computation.
To show that our libraries can cover the need of a reasonably
large population of Rust developers, we match the list of our ported
libraries with that of most downloaded Rust libraries hosted on
crates.io in recent 90 days (until October 2019). We divide li-
braries on crates.io into four categories,
• Libraries we already ported into SGX.
• Libraries that can be directly used in SGX without modifica-
tion.
• Libraries not applicable to SGX enclaves.
• Libraries that are potentially useful in SGX development but
not ported yet.
The matching results are demonstrated in Figure 4. It can be seen
that for the top 100 most popular libraries, our supply chain can
cover 60 of them (including libraries that do not need to be ported).
Excluding libraries that are not applicable to SGX, only 9 libraries
are not ported yet. If we consider the top 20 list, the availability
rate is 90% while the remaining 10% is not applicable to SGX.
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Figure 5: Auto Merge and CI Test History
We would like to emphasize that some of the libraries we ported
make the development of certain types of enclaves significantly
more productive. For example, the TLS functionality provided by the
rustls library allows networked enclaves to securely communicate
with clients, even if the TCP channels are provided by untrusted
operating systems [15]. For another example, the wasmi library
enables executing WebAssembly code in SGX, which is one of the
most wanted features by blockchain-related enclave developers. In
summary, we believe that our supply chain, with its current scale,
can cover the need for a good portion of Rust developers.
RQ2: What is the operational cost for maintaining such a
supply chain?
We configure each CI test to consist of 8 pipelines to cover dif-
ferent configurations, including two package managers (Cargo and
Xargo), two OS versions (Ubuntu 16.04 and 18.04), and two build
types (release and debug). We assign a dedicated group of SGX-
capable machines to our automation infrastructure for performing
auto merge and continuous integration tests. By the time of writing,
we have seven Intel NUC mini PCs with i7-8809G and five Lenovo
SR250 servers with Xeon E-2186G.
Figure 5 shows the weekly activities of our automation infras-
tructure. Roughly, 15% to 25% of the auto-merge and CI test attempts
failed. Most failures can be resolved in three days. It should be noted
that not all failures need to be handled manually. For example, about
10% of the CI test failures are due to network issues when there are
too many CI tasks trying to connect to crates.io at the same time.
Occasionally, our daily CI tests fail for a large proportion of the
libraries in the supply chain due to an external dependency intro-
ducing a breaking change. For example, we experienced 58 failures
on July 16, 2019 because the libc library introduced a change that
is incompatible with our supply chain, failing all CI pipelines that
use Xargo as the package manager.
RQ3: Can our library supply chain support real-world SGX
enclave development?
We are aware that multiple commercial Rust-powered SGX prod-
ucts are depending on our supply chain for development. Unfor-
tunately, we are not able to disclose the details about these cases.
Therefore, we choose to approach this research question by investi-
gating how the open-source community utilizes our supply chain
to fulfill their development requirements. All the repositories of
the third-party libraries forked by our supply chain are hosted on
GitHub. We do not get notified when developers download these
repositories, so it is difficult for us to get a comprehensive list of
projects that make use of our supply chain.
We take a best-effort approach to identify these projects. If a
Rust project intends to depend on a library hosted by us, the de-
velopers must provide the URL of the corresponding repository in
the manifest file of the project. Based on this insight, we perform
a code search on Github, using our organization account name as
the keyword, since it is a common part of the URLs of all libraries
in our supply chain. To prevent unprofessional projects from in-
troducing bias into our analysis, we apply a screening pass to the
raw search results. In particular, we filter out projects without clear
descriptions, documentations, or active commit histories. We also
filter out projects for educational and training purposes.
In the end, we identified a total of 11 qualified Github projects,
listed in Table 4. We present their names, owner types, major busi-
ness purposes, the lines of code they contain, and the number of
libraries from our supply chain on which they depend.
Themajority of our users work on projects related to blockchains
and smart contracts, which is not surprising since they typically
demand strong privacy guarantees for their data.We also have users
working in other areas, including deep learning and networked
systems. The scales of the projects are beyond trivial (up to 414K
lines of code), even if we only consider the portion written in
Rust (up to 29K lines of code). We interpret the results as strong
evidence that our supply chain has the potential to support a diverse
SGX software ecosystem. We also would like to emphasize that
most of the projects powered by our supply chain are enterprise
products and reputed open-source projects, showing that our effort
has delivered meaningful impact.
8 DISCUSSIONS
8.1 Lack of Automated Code Analysis
For most software supply chains, security and engineering qual-
ity are the primary concerns of their maintainers [10, 21]. In our
methodology, we mainly rely on manual code review for quality
Building and Maintaining a Third-Party Library Supply Chain for Productive and Secure SGX Enclave Development ICSE-SEIP ’20, May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Table 4: Open-Source Projects on Github Depending on Libraries from Our Supply Chain
Project Name Project Owner Business Purpose LoC (Rust/Total) Dependencies
crypto-com/chain Enterprise Blockchain 29,375 / 38,676 15
enigmampc/enigma-core Enterprise Blockchain 18,459 / 60,499 9
provable-things/ethereum-keys-sgx Enterprise Blockchain 1,802 / 2,322 7
smartcontractkit/chainlink-ios Enterprise Blockchain 669 / 37,130 11
smartcontractkit/chainlink Enterprise Blockchain 4,090 / 90,388 17
scs/substraTEE-worker Enterprise Blockchain 6,049 / 11,808 29
scs/substraTEE-node Enterprise Blockchain 9,493 / 10,148 4
mesalock-linux/mesatee Community Function as a Service 21,298 / 58,867 39
dmlc/tvm Community Deep Learning Compiler 5,686 / 414,247 2
occlum/occlum Enterprise Library OS 10,469 / 17,274 5
stenverbois/vulcan-rs Individual Automotive Control Networks 944 / 7,336 4
assurance. However, historical research and experience emphasized
the importance of automatic code inspection [6, 11], which are
currently absent in our workflow.
At this point, we do not view the lack of automated code analysis
to be problematic. On the one hand, the Rust type system is already
able to eliminate most low-level programming errors. To detect
errors that evade the checks of the Rust compiler, such as vulner-
abilities caused by the infamous “unsafe” annotated Rust code,
extremely sophisticated analysis techniques are required. There
have been several prototypical techniques and tools trying to tackle
this problem [5, 14], but none of them are ready for production.
On the other hand, security auditing for SGX code often requires
a deep understanding of the unconventional threat model, which
is hard to formalize and difficult to be fed to automated program
analysis systems. Our experience is that even human experts can
feel challenging to make the right decision about whether a piece
of code should be pruned in the SGX version to prevent developers
from misusing it.
We forecast that the current security auditing methodology can
be improved as the trusted computing community gradually es-
tablishes the consensus about appropriate engineering practices
for TEE enclave development. Meanwhile, we have developed the
prototype of an automated tool to help code reviewers identify
program locations that likely requires a security audit. This tool
analyzes the call graph of the enclave code and warns reviewers
about the use of untrusted resources inside SGX.
8.2 Scalability
For the past 18 months, our supply chain has been built and main-
tained by a small team of three engineers. For the long term, the
concern is that as the supply chain keeps growing, will our cur-
rent methodology still be sustainable? A study on the scalability
of Linux kernel maintainers’ work [27] indicates that a key fac-
tor affecting the workload of a maintainer is the number of files
the maintainer works on. However, assigning additional maintain-
ers for the same file only increases the productivity for a limited
amount. With more libraries to be included in our supply chain, we
would have to increase the headcount of the maintenance team. As
a result, we expect that at one point in the future, we need to shift
our maintenance model.
There are several potential directions to explore. The first is that
we cap the size of the supply chain and only maintain the most
widely used libraries for SGX developers. If so, we can retain the
current methodology. The second possible direction is to merge the
forked libraries back to the upstream so that the support for the
SGX target becomes official for these third-party libraries, although
it is not yet clear how security auditing should be conducted in
this model. The third is to offload the maintenance work to the
open-source community and form a decentralized working group
to direct the further development of the supply chain. Nevertheless,
for the latter two directions to be possible, we need to first expand
the Rust SGX development community and convince others that it
is worthwhile to pay special attention to the problem.
9 RELATEDWORK
Besides our work, there are other efforts from the industry try-
ing to build a productive SGX development community. Google’s
Asylo [1] project provides a subset of POSIX APIs for developing
SGX enclaves in C and C++. The Open Enclave project [2] from
Microsoft ported the standard C and C++ libraries into SGX, pro-
viding a more complete list of APIs than Intel SGX SDK. Both of
the two projects try to abstract away the SGX-specific details such
that they can be used to develop enclaves for other types of TEEs
in the future. In general, Asylo and Open Enclave make it much
easier to port third-party libraries into SGX since the transplan-
tation no longer needs to redesign the SGX-incompatible part of
the code. The negative effects of this, in our humble opinion, is
that it becomes too easy for SGX developers to access potentially
untrusted resources, which may loose the security consideration in
the development process. The Enclave Development Platform5 by
Fortanix follows the same methodology and it supports Rust as we
do. In general, our work has a different philosophy for SGX soft-
ware development. We believe that it is more suitable for developers
seeking the highest possible level of security for their enclaves.
The difficulty in porting software into SGX is also a well known
academic challenge and a large volume of research has tried to
improve the productivity and quality of the migration. Lind et al.
developed a method to automatically dissect software source code
into different parts, of which the security-sensitive ones are placed
5https://edp.fortanix.com/
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into SGX enclaves [17]. Wang et al. proposed a similar technique for
binary code [26]. Liu proposed an automated way to transform real-
time software into a TEE-compatible form while ensuring the soft-
ware still meets the real-time demands [18]. These methods require
manual annotation on code that accepts or produces sensitive data
and the security is enforced at a rather fine granularity. For compli-
cated data processing systems, this is usually insufficient. Sinha et
al. developed a compiler that can verify the confidentiality of mem-
ory addresses when the code is targeted for SGX [23]. SCONE [4]
and Graphene-SGX [7] are containers that allow legacy software
to run as SGX enclaves without modification. They achieve this
by simulating the programming primitives (mostly OS-dependent)
that are missing inside SGX. Similar to work from the industry,
these methods save the effort of porting individual programs, but
they blur the trust boundary of SGX to the extent that developers
do not need to re-design their software to make it indeed privacy-
preserving. Based on our porting experience, if unmodified, many
applications will leak sensitive data into the untrusted environment
or allow untrusted information to affect their behavior.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we shared our experience with constructing and
maintaining a third-party Rust library supply chain with auxiliary
tooling to assist SGX enclave development. We described the chal-
lenges in developing SGX enclaves from a software engineering
perspective. We then explained our methodology of selecting suit-
able candidate libraries to port into SGX and how we can deliver
timely updates for the ported libraries with security assurance. In
the evaluation, we showed that our supply chain offers an abundant
enough collection of Rust libraries to ease the development of SGX
enclaves for various business purposes. We believe that our work
can encourage the big data community to employ SGX as a viable
solution to privacy-preserving computation.
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